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FORGOITEN CONSTITUTIONAL IDSTORY:
THE PRODUCTION AND MIGRATION OF
MEANING WITHIN CONSTITUTIONAL
CULTURES

Gregory A. Mark*
ARGUING AsoUT SLAVERY: THE GREAT BATTLE IN THE UNITED
STATES CONGRESS. By William Lee Miller. New York: Alfred A.
Knopf. 1996. Pp. 577. $35.
FREE SPEECH IN lTs FORGOTTEN YEARS. By David M. Rabban.
New York: Cambridge University Press. 1997. Pp. xi, 404. $34.95.
When was the last time you read a serious, recently published
work of constitutional history that did not deal mainly with the
work of the Supreme Court? When, even among those works, did
the author look beyond the immediate litigants to give the reader a
sense of an evolving constitutional culture - a culture in symbiosis
with the larger political and social culture - its eddies and byways,
as well as its mainstream?
My strong hunch is that anyone who can triumphantly respond
to the implicit condemnation of narrowness in these questions will
do so in large measure having read either or perhaps both William
Lee Miller's Arguing About Slavery1 and David Rabban's Free
Speech in Its Forgotten Years.2 Both books explore unfamiliar con
texts of familiar constitutional terms; both thereby enrich and un
settle our complacent modem understanding of such terms; both
should excite our historical imaginations and cause us to look for
other untold or long-lost stories, which in tum might give us a more
capacious and ironic understanding of constitutional institutions.
What is more, both works tell us stories-ones with heroes and vil
lains, themes of hope and betrayal, and, unfortunate as it may be,
* Associate Professor of Law, Rutgers Law School-Newark, and Member of the
Graduate Faculty in History, Rutgers University-Newark. B.A. 1979, Butler; M.A. (History)
1980, Harvard; J.D. 1988, University of Chicago. - Ed. Ariela Gross some time ago gave me
extremely sage advice on writing about the history of the right to petition, and I want to take
this opportunity to thank her for that advice. I am indebted to William Bratton, Sarah
Gordon, Maxine Mark, and George Thomas for their co=ents. I would also like to thank
Amy Miller for her timely assistance in preparing this review.
1. William Lee Miller is Thomas C. Sorensen Professor of Political and Social Thought,
University of Vrrginia.
2. David Rabban is Thomas Shelton Maxey Professor, University of Texas School of Law.
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endings that are not necessarily happy. Each book also can teach
us about writing history. Each raises questions about the historian's
method. What is more, read together, they put before us the deep
est of questions regarding the construction of constitutional
meaning.
What is most interesting about each work, however, is some
thing so obvious that it may easily be overlooked. These books are
about political abstractions embodied in constitutional institutions,
structured by our predecessors' reduction of those institutions to a
few words on paper and succeeding generations' tortured fealty to
those abstractions in the face of immediate, real-life, substantive
pressures. For lawyers, each book therefore raises, implicitly at
least, questions such as whether fealty should be to the precise his
torical meaning of each clause, whether the values embodied in cer
tain constitutional language may become irrelevant to later polities,
and, even more confusing to lawyers, whether such values may be
said to migrate from one given constitutional clause to another.
Each book thus raises, without answering, the question of what in
such abstractions can command loyalty and passion.
THE STORIES3
The constitutional institution at the center of Professor Miller's
story is the right to petition for redress of grievances.4 As Professor
Miller rightly notes, "[t]oday the right of petition looks rather pale
beside those robust rights that have distinct constituencies, sharp
disagreements, and sensational cases - freedom of the press, cer
tainly, and religious liberty, and freedom of speech, or the cluster of
rights in the middle articles of the Bill of Rights that protect the
accused."5 In another era, however, when Congress, indeed the
federal government itself, was deliberately left to its own devices in
the malarial swamp from which the District of Columbia arose,6 the
right to petition was thought, by some at least, to be a core constitu
tional institution. It embodied a vision of fair and representative
government, one in which all the people, individually and collec
tively, could make governmental officials aware of their worries and
3. Because the episode discussed by Miller antedates the controversies Rabban discusses,
and for analytic reasons I develop in the last half of this review, it makes sense to discuss
Miller's book before Rabban's.
4. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."
U.S. CoNST. amend. I (emphases added).
5. Pp. 105-06; see also Gregory A. Mark, The Vestigial Constitution: The History and
Significance of the Right to Petition, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 2153, 2155-57 & nn.2-5 (1998).
6. See JAMES STERLING YOUNG, THE WASHINGTON COMMUNITY 1800-1828, at 13-37
(1966).

May 1999]

Forgotten Constitutional History

1675

difficulties, and could even propose solutions to their concerns. The
people would do so in formal documents styled petitions, and, by
taking up their grievances in such forms, the people could require
the officials to take cognizance of those grievances. In an era when
communication over time and distance was limited to documents
and messengers, and when physical isolation was profound, the cen
trality of such a device in a republican polity was palpable.7
Antebellum America, however, was no idyll of com
monwealthmen, as the book's very title suggests. The bitterly divi
sive question of slavery hung in the background of American
politics, especially of American constitutional politics, from the mo
ment of the Founding forward, belying at a deep level the existence
of a universal commonality of interest sufficient to keep all citizens
united. Miller's story is the intersection of the constitutional insti
tution which presupposed such a commonality and the institution of
slavery. From the first federal Congress, antislavery petitions had
been presented to the federal government.8 At first they were cast
in traditional petitionary form. They were measured, reasoned doc
uments, formal prayers to legislators to take action where Congress
could: to constrict the future reach of slavery, to eliminate it where
Congress had the power, and to alter the Constitution to prohibit it
entirely. Thus, as the country expanded westward, petitions vari
ously sought to keep slavery from the territories, to condition those
territories' statehood on its prohibition, and the like. For the Dis
trict of Columbia itself, where the Congress functioned as landlord
and town council, some prayers went so far as to request slavery's
local prohibition.9 Gradually, as antislavery sentiment crystallized,
as the arguments grew more precise, numerous, and pointed, so did
the vehicle for their expression. Petitions grew less formal, their
tone less civil. As prayers turned to demands, they became shorter.
The less attention they were paid, the more numerous they
became.10
What had begun as a specific articulation by some Quakers and
a vague disgust that existed at some level throughout the country
became a political movement, rooted in religiously inspired moral
ism (pp. 80-84), a movement not quite secular but not sectarian, and
with an extraordinarily pronounced regional character. The aboli
tion movement never succeeded in claiming all those who felt dis
comfort with slavery. Its rhetoric was too radical, its adherents too
7. See Mark, supra note 5, at 2161-212.
8. See William C. cliGiacomantonio, "For the Gratification of a Volunteering Society":
Antislavery and Pressure Group Politics in the First Federal Congress, 15 J. EARLY REPUBLIC
169 {1995).
9. See, e.g., p. 28.
10. See Mark, supra note 5, at 2225-26.
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eccentric in too many ways for that.11 Nonetheless, abolitionists
grew in number and formed the vanguard of antislavery sentiment
more generally. One of their political eccentricities - or at least an
eccentricity of a large minority of abolitionists - was a willingness
to countenance, at first simply as signatories on petitions, and later
to encourage, as active speakers and circulators of petitions, women
and free blacks to participate in abolitionists' work (though this en
couragement ultimately split the movement). Quakers had, in their
petitions to the early Congresses, allowed women signatories, but
later abolitionists, some Quakers included, went much farther.12
Chief among the tactics of abolitionists was a concerted attempt to
keep antislavery at the forefront of American politics, and their
chief vehicle was to petition Congress (pp. 107-12). The petition
campaign was a conscious and sustained effort, suffused with moral
ism, but a political campaign nonetheless.
By the middle of the 1830s, slavery, which had bedeviled the
workings of so many American institutions, thus collided with the
constitutional institution of petition. A decade-long clash ensued in
the Congress, more clearly and quietly in the Senate than in the
House, but almost concurrently in both chambers. Southern sena
tors, visibly irritated and insulted by the persistence of antislavery
petitioning13 and at least vaguely fearing that the Senate's constant
focus on slavery might actually result in tangible victories for anti
slavery forces, 14 succeeded quickly and without much fanfare in
having the Senate adopt a parliamentary device which automati
cally responded negatively to antislavery petitions (p. 144).
Southern representatives, who were no less irritated, insulted
and fearful than their senatorial counterparts, achieved a much
more hard-won success. What Miller does before telling the story
of what was labeled the "gag-rule," the rule of the House barring
reception of antislavery petitions, is to give enough background
briefly to set the stage. We are reminded, to be sure, of the evolu
tion of antislavery sentiment and abolitionism,15 but Miller quickly
moves to personalities rather than social forces and movements.
Young Southern representatives, perhaps egged on by the states
men of the Senate,16 quickly rose to defend the honor of the South
11. See 1 WILLIAM w. FREEHLING, THE ROAD TO DISUNION: SECESSIONISTS AT BAY
1776-1854. at 290-95 (1990).
12. See Deborah Bingham Van Broekhoven, "Let Your Names Be Enrolled": Method
and Ideology in Women's Antislavery Petitioning, in THE ABoLmONIST SISTERHOOD:
WoMEN's PoLmcAL CULTURE IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA 179, 179-85 (Jean Fagan Yellin &
'John C. Van Home eds., 1994).
13. See, e.g., pp. 117-29.
14. See FREEHLING, supra note 11, at 290-95.
15. See, e.g., pp. 65-112.
16. See, e.g., pp. 33-36.
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from petitioners, hardly restrained by their more sage elders in the
House. Why, however, was the victory so easily won in the Senate,
yet so hard-won in the House? The difference may be summed up
in one name: John Quincy Adams.
Adams is the hero of Miller's story. Southern defenders of slav
ery are the villains. No open abolitionist he,17 Adams was instead a
man more deeply committed to an abstraction of liberty contained
in the Constitution - the right of political participation and com
munication as it was embodied in the ancient institution of petition
(pp. 351-57). He fought the adoption of the gag-rule. He tested its
contours at every opportunity.18 Before the gag-rule became a per
manent rule of the House, he tried to introduce antislavery peti
tions (p. 197); he tempted political fate by attempting to query the
Speaker of the House concerning a "petition from twenty:-two per
sons, declaring themselves to be slaves" (p. 230); he was subjected
to cries and motions to censure him;19 and he led the fight for the
gag-rule's repeal. In these efforts he was joined by some, though
not many, constitutional traditionalists and a slowly growing
number of antislavery Congressmen.
Miller gives us an almost day-to-day recitation of the events as
they unfolded from the gag's adoption in 1836 until its repeal in
1844. Along the way he takes time for some excursions into related
matters. He briefly discusses the role of women in the petition
campaign,2° the struggles within the political parties, including
those based on slavery,21 the nature of antebellum Protestantism,22
and other related topics. But, overwhelmingly, Miller's is a story of
personality and conflict - Adams and allies, at first laid low, later
triumphant (pp. 476-79). Adams, the hero, collapses in the House
and dies within days, only a few years after the gag's repeal (pp.
458-59). Waddy Thompson, one of Adams's young antagonists,
overreaching in the attempt to censure Adams, ultimately gone
from the House at the gag's repeal, "[h]e would lose his fortune in
the Civil War - and (would it be proper to add?) would then be to
historical memory one of the obscurest of the obscure Whigs. Fare
well to Waddy Thompson" (p. 478).
Despite his brief excursions into related matters, Miller's focus
on personality dominates his interpretation of history. Slavery is
17. Freehling describes him as "a closet abolitionist," see FREEHLING, supra note 11 at
259, and "not publicly an abolitionist," id. at 342.
18. The most recent scholarly treatment is David C. Frederick, John Quincy Adams, Slavery, and the Disappearance of the Right to Petition, 9 L. & HIST. REv. 113 (1991).
19. See, e.g., pp. 42944.
20. See, e.g., pp. 48, 110-11.
21. See, e.g., pp. 375-87.
22. See, e.g., pp. 80-89.
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largely reduced to nothing but a moral question, rather than an
amalgam of class, racial, economic, religious, and other factors, in
cluding the moral one, making the creation of heroes (and villains)
easier. Similarly - and more importantly from the perspective of
legal and constitutional scholars, historians, and others - the insti
tution of petitioning in Miller's account is equally unidimensional.
Other than the claims of the constitutional traditionalists in the
House who felt that the right had been abridged, we are left won
dering what it was about the right to petition that inspired Adams
and his small band of brothers, and what it was that failed of respect
where so many others were concerned. We learn that the right to
petition was "sacred," but its sanctity rings hollow to us, not simply
because we do not regard petitioning as central to our political life,
but also because Miller's treatment of petitioning imbues it with so
little political and moral content, as contrasted with the unalloyed
moralism of his analysis of slavery. We are thus left wondering
what Adams was really doing, what informed his belief in petition
ing. Miller's focus on personality at the expense of richer context
thus has the perverse effect of making both his heroes and villains
less complex, thus more prone to being, respectively, undermined
or rehabilitated by those who know the institutional details. Such
details would transform the historical roles of the participants from
mere moralists to men of varying and nuanced moralities, morali
ties tempered by the vices forced on them by historical circum
stance. While, for example, moral opposition to slavery is easy to
understand, loyalty to the right to petition may seem merely eccen
tric or quixotic without such details.
While Professor Miller's book reopens the story of a forgotten
constitutional institution, Professor Rabban tells us a forgotten
story about a very familiar institution and upsets some constitu
tional iconography along the way. The traditional story of free
speech is that, with the exception of some incidents of suppression
associated with the Alien and Sedition Acts in the waning years of
the eighteenth century, free speech entered into our constitutional
consciousness almost ex nihilo in the early twentieth century.
World War I and its attendant suppression of pacifist, socialist, or
otherwise seemingly suspicious speech spurred a reluctant Supreme
Court to action.23 Aided by Zechariah Chafee's pioneering schol
arship,24 Justices Brandeis and Holmes led the Court into the pro
tection of political speech which, decades later, the Warren Court
23. See, e.g., ALFRED H. KELLY, ET AL., THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION AND ITS ORIGINS
& DEVELOPMENT 140-41, 526-27 (6th ed. 1983).
24. See ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1920); Zechariah Chafee, Jr.,
Freedom ofSpeech, 17 NEw REPUBLIC 66 (1918); Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Freedom ofSpeech
in War Time, 32 HAR.v. L. REv. 932 (1919).
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broadened into protection of cultural expression more generally (p.
1). Wrong, says Rabban. Not just wrong, but perniciously so.
For decades before World War I, Rabban reveals, individuals
and organizations pursuing a wide range of ends sought protection
for their speech when harassed and prosecuted. Proponents of cul
tural transformation - including advocates of such scandalous
objectives as sexual freedom and birth control (pp. 27-44), defend
ers of organized labor (pp. 77-125), and others
all made claims
that their expression was protected. Their faith, or at least the faith
they articulated, like that of Adams before them, was an an abstrac
tion rendered by writing into a constitutional institution: freedom of
speech.25 And, like Adams, they had to wait, but not for a decade
- rather, they had to wait for half a century or more before their
faith was rewarded.
-

These cultural friends of free speech waited because the execu
tive branch, the traditional organ suspicious of eccentric public ex
pression, was abetted by a legislature with powerful conformist and
seemingly majoritarian political impulses,26 and by a judiciary that
refused to read the First Amendment as anything but a supercodifi
cation of common law doctrines limiting prior restraint (pp. 13246). All branches of government did what they did at least in part
because the speakers were culturally marginal, their speech all the
more so. They articulated concerns not just eccentric, but eccentric
in ways perceived as antithetical to what was proper in a good soci
ety.27 The judiciary, in the traditional story, thus broke ranks when
Holmes and Brandeis, influenced by Chafee, redefined the First
Amendment to protect political speech, carving out an exception in
the pattern of suppression (p. 1).
However laudable the creation of that toehold for free speech,
Rabban tells us that it was based in error, probably willful error.
Rabban's most interesting subtale is his reconstruction, and conse
quent destruction, of Chafee's seminal articles in which Chafee at
tributed to Holmes an interpretation of the Free Speech Clause that
Holmes never intended. Rabban says Chafee willfuly
l
read
Holmes's opinion in Schenck v. United States28 as narrowing the
doctrine of prior restraint with its "clear and present danger" lan
guage when, in fact, no evidence for such a reading exists and much
contradictory evidence abounds (pp. 322-26). Why, then, did
25. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom ofspeech, or of the press; or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of griev
ances." U.S. CoNST. amend. I (emphases added).
26. See, e.g., pp. 249-56.
27. See, e.g., pp. 28, 252.
28. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
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Holmes go along with Chafee? Something more than the mutual
loyalty of Harvard men must have been at stake.
Rabban notes that Holmes maintained that his analysis of free
speech was consistent from long before Schenck until long after
(pp. 346-47, 355). Rabban convincingly demonstrates othenvise.
Nonetheless, he only skirts the edges of speculation about what
might have motivated the change (p. 350). Chafee, through the
good offices of Harold Laski, actually met with Holmes in the
months before Holmes began to shift his views (pp. 353-54).
Rabban is careful not to conclude that Chafee then, or at any other
time, changed Holmes's mind. Nor does Rabban conclude that
others who criticized Holmes for an astringent understanding of
free speech, notably Ernst Freund of the University of Chicago Law
School,29 persuaded him of error. Nor, as Holmes made clear pri
vately (p. 356), did he suddenly develop an appreciation for popular
political discourse. We are allowed to infer, however, that Holmes
was not beyond being influenced, and that the considered opinion
of other learned members of the legal and political elite had its ef
fect - not, perhaps, as pure persuasion, but as an indication that at
least some of the speech at issue might be that of persons not quite
so culturally marginal as generally supposed (pp. 346-49). Even if
Holmes still viewed much of this speech as that of "an ass . . .
drool[ing] about proletarian dictatorship" (p. 356), the fact that
others of his ilk felt the drool worth defending may have led him to
acknowledge that defense of speech, at least of political speech, had
moved away from the periphery and somewhat closer to the core of
respectability and acceptance. Indeed, that he even felt it incum
bent to mention his defense of the right suggests that he was sensi
tive to the attention being paid to free speech.
Thus, like Miller, Rabban finds two groups of heroes. Free
speech plaintiffs and their lawyers, like antislavery petitioners
before them, exercised their rights and did so from the very margins
of society. Their defenders - Adams, Brandeis, Hand, and the
condescending Holmes - by their defense lent legitimacy to a
broader understanding of the utility of tolerance and the demo
cratic value of speech. Nonetheless, Rabban, like Miller, has cast
his story in traditional terms: interest groups whose interests are
best exemplified by important personalities.
Why did the plaintiffs believe in the right in the first place? I
doubt very much that every birth control advocate, every defender
of organized labor, and every other speaker of the unacceptable
shared Thomas Cooley's rejection of the Blackstonian notion that
the Free Speech Clause merely set out the governing common law
29. See Ernst Freund, The Debs Case and Freedom of Speech, 19
(1919), reprinted in 40 U. Cm. L. REv. 239 (1973).

NEW REPUBLIC
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on prior restraint (pp. 177, 192). Holmes's curious metaphor, "the
marketplace of ideas," also fails to capture the faith with which ad
herents of bad, losing, eccentric, unpopular, and sometimes genu
inely pernicious ideas pursued them then and pursue those ideas
even today; nor is the marketplace metaphor particularly apt for
those who genuinely believe in free communication, even when
they regard the content as drivel, or worse. Indeed, is there any
evidence other than the tautological for the notion that the measure
of the worth of an idea is its acceptance? Something deeper in the
culture was at work; something deeper motivated generations of
cultural radicals to keep articulating free speech claims in the face
of the hostility of the courts. In contrast with Miller, who leaves us
to wonder about the motivations of the constitutional traditionalists
who defended the right to petition, Rabban links the right of free
speech to the belief of libertarian radicals in "the primary value of
individual autonomy against the power of church and state" (p. 23).
Rabban argues that desire for such autonomy was what led its pro
ponents and defenders to go to such lengths on behalf of an abstrac
tion. General autonomy rationales, however, tend to lose out when
weighed against immediate and keenly felt threats to more concrete
interests.
RECASTING THE STORIES

For the record, I am among those who hold to that faith in the
value of free communication. Nonetheless, as with all faiths, the
empirical support for the utility and virtue of free communication is
thin, at best. (I hasten to add, however, that the empirical support
for those who would limit speech in the name of the larger good has
always struck me as equally, if not more, thin.) What might we
gain, however, if we read both Miller and Rabban somewhat uncon
ventionally, recasting their works sympathetically but doing so in
ways consonant with the themes of their works? We need not read
Miller as simply a story about antislavery forces clashing with
Southern interests, the petitioners against the slavocracy. We might
instead read it as one about an abstraction - the right to petition
- pitted against concrete interests, those of slavery. Similarly, we
need not read Rabban simply as a story about culturally marginal
agitators battling a conformist majority personified in a hostile judi
ciary. We may, rather, view it as a story about proponents of an
abstraction - the right of free speech - pitted against the interests
of a polity weakly committed to this abstraction but led by a gov
erning group intensely interested in the preservation of an estab
lished order. I do not mean to suggest that this is not already a
component of the stories both authors tell, though it is a much
greater part of Rabban's story than of Miller's. But even in
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Rabban's work, the story of the autonomy rationale as the basis for
a free speech faith sometimes sounds, as Rabban would be among
the first to admit, a bit self-serving (pp. 381-93). We also know that
all too often proponents of their own autonomy have precious little
respect for autonomy claims of others.30
The theoretical implications for the First Amendment of won
dering about the historical force of constitutional abstractions are
clear. Every time the government seeks to suppress petitioners or
speakers, it does so claiming that the greater good will be protected.
Southerners trumpeted the gag-rule not just as a protection for
Southern honor and interests,31 but as a protection of the Union
and the interests of a united and strong America.32 Legal tradition
alists claimed that the "bad tendency" test allowed for punishment
of speech that led to social unrest, riot, division of the classes, and
difficulties in the conduct of military policy.33 In every case the
claims were, if not true, at least plausible and difficult to refute.
Arrayed against claims of specific dangers, specific harms, and
palpable injury were the necessarily inchoate interests of freedom
and rights, abstractions removed from the concerns of those af
fected by their exercise. Modern political theorists of the public
choice school have a powerful reason for suggesting that this read
ing renders the subsequent course of events implausible. According
to such theorists, abstract and inchoate interests tend to lose to spe
cific interests because attachment to more general concerns tends
to be weaker, thinner, and more diffuse than attachment to specific
interests. Hence we should not expect, the argument goes, a gen
eral public expression of belief in free speech, the right to petition,
or any other equivalent claim, to be able to hold up against the
concentrated and passionate claims of groups with specific ratio
nales for limiting such freedoms, especially when they can point to
immediate injuries and can conjure others.
Nonetheless, we know that both the right to petition and the
freedom of speech, not the slavocracy and repressive cultural inter
ests who used the federal government as their tool, ultimately tri
umphed. Why? Let us indulge a very simple public choice thought
experiment grounded in these books. These works suggest at least
two aspects of constitutional culture that deserve to be addressed
from both historical and theoretical perspectives. First, it may be
that our constitutional culture has created, and is itself a product of,
30. One thinks, in recent American history, of Nazi marchers in Skokie, Illinois, for ex
ample, or those who confiscate right-wing college newspapers, or violent antiabortion protes
tors who make full use of the panoply of available constitutional rights.
31. See, e.g., p. 127.
32. See, e.g., pp. 128-29.
33. See, e.g., pp. 276-78.
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a set of expectations about the conduct of government that is con
tinually reinforced and strengthened by challenges to those expec
tations. That is, the general interest in the exercise of constitutional
rights gives way to momentary specific interests, but, over time, the
general interest outlives the specific interest and wins out, stronger
and more resilient for the exercise. In other words, our constitu
tional culture may develop something like antibodies, to use an un
fortunate analogy. Nonetheless, even that hypothesis does not
really address the position advanced by the public choice theorists.
The general and diffuse claim should still be defeated by the spe
cific claim and should have no reason to rise again, since every so
cial and political moment gives rise to reasons to limit expression.
In the case of the gag-rule, a Southern minority with an intense
attachment to slavery overcame a weak majoritarian attachment to
the right to petition. The right to petition had, after all, lost its cen
trality as a means of political participation, and the Southerners
were careful to conjure dangers that might arise from petitioning such as dissolution of the Union - that could actually rouse
majoritarian fears. Furthermore, Southerners did their level best to
separate the general institution of petitioning from its use by the
most socially marginal petitioners, women and free blacks, whom
they attacked with special virulence, ignoring - if they even knew
it - petition's own history as the universal means of political par
ticipation. The gag was defeated, however, not as a result of the
rise of pro-petition sentiment within the voting public, but rather as
a result of the rise of an amalgam of political sentiments, including
antislavery and sectional identification, among voters. Nonetheless,
with the defeat of the gag-rule, public identification with expressive
rights turned the prior efforts to stifle petitions into something with
which to tar proslavery politicians.
Thus, the general claim for free expression persists, eclipsed but
not defeated. Because it continues to exist as a social icon, it stands
in opposition to the more specific claim even while in eclipse. It
continues to resist and eventually, when the specific claim fades
away, apparently emerges stronger than at the outset. This, then, is
the second proposition worth exploring: that general support for
free expression is not itself actually challenged.
Both Miller and Rabban provide some evidence for the second
proposition. Miller's is quite emphatic - Southern representatives
never actually attacked the right to petition, though a few made
light of it,34 even in the face of the continued rear-guard actions of
John Quincy Adams in the House. When the proslavery
34. "Hitherto we have been fighting about mere abstractions. Hitherto we have been
contending about the right of petition, and other minor and unimportant points." 12 CoNG.
DEB. 2494 (1836) (statement of Rep. Pinckney of South Carolina).
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Representatives were dismissive, it counted against them (p. 106 .
Rabban's evidence is somewhat different. He shows that a wide
variety of individuals and groups continually advanced free speech
claims, claims they - or at least their lawyers - must have known
were extreme long-shots at best, last-ditch desperation arguments
at worst, given established doctrine and opinion. Nonetheless, the
arguments were made. What is more remarkable, however, is the
response that the arguments made by the believers in free speech
and petition engendered.
At first glance Rabban's work seems at odds with the premise of
the thought experiment. The cultural dissidents were the minority,
after all, and they captured nothing, certainly not the institutions of
government. But the premise of the thought experiment is the gen
eral but relatively weak public attachment to the right of free
speech. The interest group that captured the government therefore
would be an elite defending an established order out of fear that the
cultural dissidents might gain majoritarian sympathy and alter that
order. (Certainly not all of the dissidents fit the pattern, but even if
birth control advocates, for example, were unlikely to capture
majoritarian support, those in control of the government linked
them to causes with such potential if in no other way than through
parallel forms of suppression.) The elite defending the order was
itself, after all, a form of minority interest group. The emergence of
free speech as a protected right came about not when the general
public demanded it, but rather when members of the elite them
selves saw instrumental value in certain dissident expression, and
then only for speech that embodied that instrumental value.
Opponents of antislavery petitions and of the expression of cul
tural and political dissidents were generally, though not universally,
careful to portray themselves as not opposed to the exercise of the
right to petition or the exercise of free speech either generally or in
the abstract. Usually, in fact, their tactics often explicitly amounted
to characterizing the exercise of either right as an abuse of the right
or as something other than its exercise in the first place. Such at
tempts to isolate and distinguish the contested exercise from the
abstraction thus allowed them to proclaim their continued support
of the abstraction (p. 13).
These proclamations, even if they were - as they must have
been in at least a few cases - nothing but lip service to the consti
tutional abstractions, were at least uttered. And they must have
been uttered for a reason. Those proclaiming such fealty believed,
they must have believed, that they would pay a political price for
actually articulating opposition to free petition or speech. Further
more, they must have felt that such a price was too high to bear in
their support of more specific claims, even if the price was not very
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high as an absolute matter. It was a relatively cheap political align
ment to support the abstraction, relatively costly to oppose it.
No matter how thin the actual support for the abstract rights,
however, the salient point is that individuals who opposed particu
lar exercises of the right to petition or of free speech felt that they
had something to gain by noting their support for the rights in the
abstract. Of course, the corollary is that an appreciative public
stood ready to hear such support (p. 13), indeed may have required
it in order to entertain the claim that an exception should be made
to the more general right or to listen to a claim that a particular act
was not covered by the protection of such rights. Crudely put, no
one has ever won an election in this country by running against
freedom, at least in the abstract. In other countries, however, (and
the twentieth century is littered with examples) politicians pay no
price or may even curry electoral success with such opposition.35
Such speculation may demonstrate the persistence of a public
constitutional culture resting on a belief in a set of abstractions,
such as rights to petition and free speech. It does not, however,
deal with the larger issue of how the specific interests challenging
the particular expressions of the abstract rights evaporate. That is
the other side of the public choice explanation - since the general
belief, if it is only weakly held, cannot actually defeat the specific
claim, the latter must itself lose support if the general belief is to
come out on top. The explanation is, at least in part - as exempli
fied in these two works - that interest groups come and interest
groups go. That is, minority interest groups that must capture the
political structure to achieve their goals must strike deals with other
minority interest groups, a la Madison in Federalist No. 10. When
such alliances collapse, the interests of any particular minority are
vulnerable, even to a rather weakly supported majoritarian posi
tion. Alternatively, the minority interest group must either disap
pear or become so marginal that it is unable to enforce its single
minded will on a majority with a set of diffuse and therefore weaker
concerns. In either case, the story of collapse or decline is contextu
ally specific. The decline of a proslavery group in Congress able to
enforce its will on the rest is both a story of lost allies and marginal
ization. By 1844 the proslavery representatives had lost key allies
in the House for a wide variety of political and other reasons (pp.
477-79). They were thus unable to muster the majority necessary to
maintain the repressive gag-rule. The decline of strength in the
House is, however, merely description and not explanation. It only
describes membership in the House and does not itself explain the
35. See, e.g., Stephen F. Cohen, "Transition" Is a Motion Rooted in U.S. Ego, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 27, 1999, at B7; Lee Hochstader, Once Upon a Ruble, Ah, Life Was Grand; Nostalgia
Feeding Communist Comeback, WASH. PoST, Nov. 12, 1995, at A27.
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underlying political shift. At least in part, the proslavery forces, in
cluding the House members themselves, helped to marginalize
themselves by their continued support of the gag-rule (pp. 479-80).
It was an issue in some of the campaigns for the House. While not
central, perhaps, it played a role in demonizing proslavery senti
ment and mobilizing a political center wary of the extreme claims
made by the firebrand Southerners (p. 484).
The triumph of cultural proponents of free speech is at least as
thickly contextual and more elongated than the decline of support
for the gag-rule. The movements for sexual freedom, birth control,
organized labor, pacifism, socialism, anarchism, and many others
that Rabban notes as intimately connected to the history of free
speech have been the subject of almost countless books and articles
themselves. Nothing would be gained (and much lost) to sketch out
here the history of any of these movements in this country, except
to note the obvious: each has a rich and complex history, one in
which success or failure cannot be measured by electoral margins in
the House (or in any political body or bodies) but which must be
measured by acceptance, often co-optation, of ideas. By most
measures, therefore, all but socialism and pacifism have been suc
cessful, and even socialism and pacifism have achieved victories,
both political and programmatic.36
None of this is to say, however, that the successes of such move
ments were expedited by the crude attempts at repression charac
teristic of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. What
may be true, however, is that such repressive efforts created a pe
riphery of expression the suppression of which opened up a core of
speech, political speech, that could - by the very creation of pe
riphery and core - more easily be defended under the Free Speech
Clause. Rabban's graceful explanation of the role of progressive
political and social theorists is crucial in understanding the creation
of that core and worth quoting at some length.
Originally,

[t]he progressive position [was] that individual rights should be recog
nized only to the extent that they contribute to social interests[, and
this position] applied in principle to speech as well as to liberty of
contract. Pound explicitly acknowledged this point when he justified
balancing social interests in free speech against competing social in
terests in the security of state institutions. The commitment of
progressives to the creation of a harmonious community also limited
36. Indeed, some conservative thinkers believe that socialism has achieved full-blown
progra=atic victories. See, e.g., MILTON & RosE FRIEDMAN, FREE To CHoosB 311-12
(1980) (reprinting the Socialist Platform of 1928 and noting that virtually all of its provisions
have been at least partially implemented in some form). While the pacifist movement has
seemed hopelessly utopian, treaty restrictions on the size of naval vessels and on the use of
chemical and biological weapons are examples of successful measures motivated by the hor
ror of war.
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their conception of free speech. While often recognizing the social
value of criticism, progressives ignored and occasionally condemned
dissent that did not contribute to the community.
The dual commitment of progressives to critical inquiry and com
munity harmony created a tension at the core of their attitudes about
free speech. . . .
Progressive intellectuals frequently invoked the value of critical
inquiry in science as a model for democratic life. . . .
The tension between critical inquiry and community harmony, evi
dent even in the limited realm of scientific theory, became exacer
bated as progressives extended the model of science to social issues
and had enormous implications for the role of free speech in a democ
racy. [pp. 212-14]
On Rabban's understanding, therefore, before World War I com
munity harmony, structured along the ideals propounded by the
progressives, dominated their own interest in critical inquiry.
World War I was a catalyst in transforming the views of the progres
sives. The Espionage Act, and prosecutions commenced under its
authority, moved the progressive center from complacency about
critical inquiry to concern. As Rabban put it,

Many progressive publicists, who had eagerly joined the Wilson ad
ministration and supported the war effort, became increasingly con
cerned about the repression of speech during and especially after the
war. . . .
The [emergence of modem First Amendment doctrine] reflected
the continuing influence of progressive ideology and the debate over
antiwar speech during which [it] developed. It is most striking that
the postwar civil libertarians essentially limited the protection of the
First Amendment to political expression. [pp. 302-03; footnotes
omitted]
The progressive intellectual capacity first to create the tension be
tween inquiry and community, and then to shift the balance from
community to inquiry while retaining the dichotomy, effectively
created a core of speech to be protected and a periphery that could
be legitimately compromised. The progressives could thus simulta
neously engage in a doctrinal revision, co-opt a libertarian streak in
free speech rhetoric, and legitimate that position by leaving an
"other," the repression of which they, along with a conformist ma
jority, approved.
The progressive volte face highlights the final theoretical ques
tion raised by these books. For constitutional lawyers the question
raises issues which may be extremely problematic. For constitu
tional historians used to exploring the changing meaning of text
through the vehicle of court cases, it may be unsettlingly revisionist.
For cultural and intellectual historians, however, it may be old hat.
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Simply put, each book subtly asks whether what are today called
"constitutional values," especially "First Amendment values," may
not have been embodied in different bits of constitutional text over
time. The books, especially taken together, suggest that such values
may migrate from one clause to another, even within the same
amendment, as the physical, social, and political circumstances of
the country change.
Political speech may have actually been at the very core of First
Amendment values all along. Indeed, Rabban makes such a claim
(p. 13). The Founders, drawing on their experience and the vicari
ous experience of colonial and English history as they learned it,
may very well have understood that political expression is founda
tional in any political culture dependent on participation by those
outside an oligarchy. They no doubt believed that a certain breadth
of political participation was necessary legitimately to ground their
claims that this country's political institutions rested in popular sov
ereignty. They certainly claimed that they valued public commen
tary on the actions of the government. How, then, could political
speech not be at the core of the First Amendment?
Rabban's reference to the progressives' idyllic vision of critical
inquiry is telling. Not for them the hurly burly of an open and
schismatic politics. Rather, criticism was originally to serve com
munitarian political ends. But, of course, the ordered and struc
tured politics of community was not just a progressive vision. It was
also a vision of the Founders. The vehicle for pure political speech
at the Founding, at least the one which had a historical pedigree,
was not the Speech or the Press Clause, but rather the Petition
Clause, the clause at the center of Miller's work. Free speech as a
distinct legal right, by contrast, was in its infancy. For most of Eng
lish and much of colonial history, the right to petition protected and
ensured the broadest popular access to the organs and officers of
government,37 so long as the communication was formally stated3B
and politely, that is, deferentially, phrased.39 In this way political
complaints served to reinforce rather than divide the political com
munity. One of the stories - largely untold - of the late eight
eenth and the early nineteenth centuries is the erosion of the
petition as the primary vehicle for political expression and political
expression's subsequent democratic reincarnation in the Speech
and Press Clauses.
This migration of protection for political speech from petition to
speech and press is but one form of the disruptive migration of
meaning within constitutional culture that historians are now un37. See Mark, supra note 5, at 2161-91.
38. See id. at 2170-74.
39. See id. at 2165, 2186 & n.146.
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covering. In another sphere - for example, the separation of pow
ers - one thinks of the innovative work of Christine Desan on
eighteenth-century legislative adjudication.40 Such migrations dis
rupt a lawyer's search for continuity in constitutional meaning and
remind historians who trace back the history of portions of texts
that they should be keenly aware of anachronism. Read together,
Miller and Rabban have provided the legal and historical communi
ties with wonderful new lenses through which to understand the
nineteenth-century disruption and transformation of the constitu
tional culture and meaning of free expression.
Perhaps most important of all, the works remind us that there
was a constitutional history in the nineteenth century, but to un
cover it we must often look in unfamiliar places, not contenting our
selves with received wisdom and twentieth-century categories of
doctrine and structure. One implicit component of the received
wisdom is that the nineteenth century was a century of relative
peace as far as constitutional rights litigation is concemed41 and
that the forays of federal courts into the arena, notably in Dred
Scott v. Sandford42 and Lochner v. New York43 (which is regarded
as a nineteenth-century case in spite of its year of decision), suggest
that the quietude may have been a good thing. Perhaps the conven
tional view is correct in that we did have to wait for Holmes and
Brandeis, even for the Warren Court, before we could have the
constitutional culture of which we are generally so proud today.
Rabban and Miller, however, offer us a counterthesis, if we just
know where to look.
Where might we look? Rabban and Miller implicitly offer use
ful suggestions. Miller's work suggests that we should look to other
institutions of government, especially the Congress, to understand
how fundamental rights were viewed.44 Moreover, it also suggests
that we look not just to other institutions, but other clauses of the
Constitution as well. One example comes immediately to mind
from the same era Miller explores. In addition to the petition cam
paign, abolitionists attempted to send pamphlets throughout the
country, and especially into the South. The Post Office - really,
postmasters - intercepted many of the pamphlets and refused to
deliver them.45 This, of course, amounted to censorship. So far as I
40. See Christine A. Desan, The Constitutional Commitment to Legislative Adjudication
in the Early American Tradition, 111 HARV. L. REv. 1381 (1998).
41. Rabban makes that point explicitly about free speech. P. 1.
42. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
43. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
44. Of course, Miller is neither unique nor novel in this regard. James Willard Hurst long
ago made such a suggestion, both explicitly and implicitly in his own work. See JAMES Wn..
LARD HURST, THE GROWIH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS (1950).
45. See FREEHLING, supra note 11, at 291-92, 309-10.
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know, this episode is little mentioned in the literature of legal his
tory, despite its parallels to late nineteenth- and twentieth-century
Post Office restrictions on the use of the mails for obscene and
other forms of literature. Why do we know so little of this episode?
Can the explanation be simply that no memorable litigation
ensued?
Similarly, we know that state constitutions contained clauses
parallel to those found in the Bill of Rights and elsewhere in the
Constitution. Despite a burst of enthusiasm for state constitutional
protections that ensued as federal courts retreated from the pro
gressive constitutionalism of the Warren Court, we know surpris
ingly little about state constitutional history, especially about how
such rights clauses fared in state courts in the nineteenth century.46
Indeed, the story may be that no litigation at all was grounded in
such clauses. That is generally what we think, but do we think so
simply because next to no serious work has been done on such ac
tions? Perhaps, like so much other nineteenth-century litigation,
records remain unpublished. To uncover such stories, perhaps we
need simply to dig deeper, as William Treanor has done even on the
well-covered ground of the power to declare war47 (among other
topics). Perhaps as Miller suggests, we should look to other institu
tions to see how constitutional meaning evolved. Perhaps, as Rab
ban does, we should just look a little further back in the Decennial
and Century Editions of the American Digest and not look at such
indices through the blinders of what is taken as the final word on
the subject.48
David Hackett Fischer some years ago catalogued the profes
sional sins of historians in Historians' Fallacies: Toward a Logic of
Historical Thought. Fischer was professionally generous and did
not criticize lawyers for their failings as historians. Lawyers as well
as professional historians are, however, guilty of the worst forms of
what he termed the "fallacy of presentism"49 and the "fallacy of
tunnel history."50 No one can, of course, deny that at least some of
the reason we study the past is to secure meaning for ourselves in
the present. Nor, of course, can anyone present all of history in one
gulp. Rabban and Miller, however, enlarge and expand our recog
nition of much, though admittedly not all, of the context and
choices available to the historical actors. They are conscious that
46. Our knowledge is at its thinnest in the antebellum period.
47. See William Michael Treanor, Fame, the Founding, and the Power to Declare War, 82
CORNELL L. REv. 695 (1997).
48. Rabban looked at state cases dealing with speech in addition to uncovering lost schol
arship and popular advocacy. P. 19.
49. DAVID HACKEIT FISCHER, HISTORIANS' FALLACIES: TOWARD A Lome OF HISTORI·
CAL THOUGHT 135-40 (1970).
50. Id. at 142-44.
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what they write may,. perhaps ought to, affect our current constitu
tional culture. In so doing they raise historiographical questions of
the first order.
Rabban, in fact, deliberately raises many questions of interpre
tation of the history of ideas in the opening of his work (pp. 9-12,
17-19, 21), though his is otherwise a very conventional monograph.
It is, therefore, a very important book for the story it tells and for
what he has uncovered, not so much for the methodology he em
ploys. He is correct, however, that many theoretical options pres
ent themselves, quite temptingly in some cases, to a modem
historian. Indeed, something of a generational divide exists in the
historical community. One need only sit in on a colloquium dedi
cated to the study of history to hear the different voices. Graduate
students and newly minted Ph.Ds. speak, among other things, the
language of literary criticism and are eager to apply it to historical
sources. Whether that application will, in and of itself, expose lay
ers of meaning that have gone unseen by older generations of schol
ars is an open question. I understand that Rabban intends to
explore that very topic in future work on intellectual historiogra
phy. He notes that "[m]any scholars warn that an idea can have
such radically different meanings for different people that any at
tempt to analyze it as a coherent subject is doomed to failure" (p.
9). Rabban apparently rejects such a conclusion - after all, the
book continues for nearly four hundred more pages in an attempt
to give coherent meaning to an episode of constitutional history while accepting the clear reality of contingent meanings and multi
ple interpretations. I believe he is correct in his operating assump
tions. Few, if any, interpretations are definitive, but many are more
persuasive and enlightening than others. The more successful the
interpretation, in my experience at least, the more one can count on
the author having asked fundamental questions and having revis
ited original materials or visited materials previously unknown.
That all knowledge is partial hardly defeats the claim that one inter
pretation is more useful - or, to be vulgar, simply better-than
another.
Miller presents an altogether different historiographical con
cern. He explicitly raises no questions of historical method or inter
pretation. Like Rabban, however, he has visited original materials
and told us an important story. Unlike Rabban, however, Miller
seeks a popular and not an academic audience. (By further con
trast, much of what Rabban has written was published during the
1980s and 1990s in law review articles (p. x n.4).) Moreover,
Miller's work is dotted with explicit references to moral and polit
ical difficulties that have confronted the United States in the past
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few decades, notably the civil rights movement51 and the Vietnam
War,52 and he makes explicit his analogies in both the political and
moral contexts.53 He overtly seeks a certain kind of meaning inspiration and moral reflection - by historical analogy.54 Histori
cal analogy, however, is problematic both as a matter of interpreta
tion, as Fischer has noted,55 and as a guide to thinking about
present-day concerns, as Ernest May has demonstrated.56
Nonetheless, in seeking to identify both heroes and villains and
to draw lessons from their conduct, Miller revives the oldest of
American historical traditions. Before history became the province
of academics and history departments came under the sway of Ger
man-trained historians (who viewed historical study as a science),
American history was a literary endeavor, and the stories were con
trived to inspire and to teach, above all to teach moral lessons, usu
ally ones applicable to the polity as a whole. One eventual
consequence of the introduction of Germanic scientism was the de
cline of history as literature. The rise of scientism also led to spe
cialization, and with specialization came studies that separated the
American polity into classes, factions, and interest groups. Histori
ans who claimed that America was, as a polity, committed to an
overarching political ideal, or even a group of political ideas, over
time came in for enormous criticism and even contempt. With the
demise of the "consensus school" of history in the 1960s and 1970s,
the serious attempt to generalize about nationally unifying political
themes was virtually abandoned.s1
What is striking about both works is their quiet revival of the
notion of a polity committed to a political ideal.58 Unlike, say, the
American liberal tradition in the grand and subtly tragic vision of
Louis Hartz,59 Rabban and Miller do not envision an ideologically
cramped polity, cosseted by history. Rather, each sees a polity
committed to a particular manifestation of a political ideal at some
general level. This ideal is roundly compromised in fact but, despite
the compromise, returns to live another day. This ideal is, in both
See, e.g., pp. 74, 78, 82.
See, e.g., pp. 316, 375.
See, e.g., p. 3.
See, e.g., p. 504.
See FISCHER, supra note 49, at 243-59.
See ERNEST R. MAY, "LESSONS" OF THE PAST: THE UsE AND M1susE OF HISTORY IN
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (1973).
57. See MORTON J. HORWTIZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960:
THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 251-52, 257-58 (1992).
58. See, e.g., Miller pp. 22-24; Rabban p. 13.
59. See Louis HAR1Z, THE LIBERAL TRADmoN IN AMERICA: AN INTERPRETATION OF
AMERICAN PoLmCAL THOUGHT SINCE THE REVOLUTION (1955).
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
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cases, one of expression and its capacity to structure the nation's
social culture and political life.
One of the grand themes of the old morally didactic style of
history as literature was the strength and uniqueness of liberty in
America. America was morally superior to Europe's corrupt and
decadent societies, and the histories celebrated that difference. By
the late 1960s and certainly by the 1970s such celebratory views
were thoroughly in disrepute, and historians emphasized conflict
and social history. The historians emphasized social context even in
political and intellectual history, and within social context the myr
iad groups that formed America jockeying for position in society.
Gone from the story along with triumphalism were ideals or polit
ical themes that knit the country together. Moreover, historians
had begun to give us subtler accounts of American debts, political
and otherwise, to England and continental Europe. In these stories
the theme of freedom and liberty was sometimes slighted or forgot
ten, sometimes told from its darker side, or displaced by the tale of
the rise of liberalism from its ideological forebears, such as
republicanism.
Rabban and Miller, however, refocus our attention on the
theme of liberty and freedom but without the self-congratulatory
tone of earlier writers. Instead they tell us about conflicts within
the larger theme, the struggle and compromises, the political and
intellectual tactics, and, to some degree at least, the social context
of freedom and liberty. In doing so they have begun a difficult task,
one that differs from the tasks undertaken by previous historians.
Whereas the triumphal style took freedom and liberty as both given
and good, and whereas a more modem school took a degree of
freedom for granted and either slighted its impact or told tales of its
dark side, Rabban and Miller have undertaken to explain why and
how people involved in the conflicts so dear to modem historians
valued such freedom and liberty, and to describe the efforts made
on behalf of an abstraction and the compromises made in its name.
They put flesh, not simply words, to belief systems of individuals,
groups, and, ultimately, American society as a whole. These are,
then, works which should assist historians, not just in their particu
lar contributions, but for the larger theme of which the works are
emblematic. Both authors have given life to the history of constitu
tional institutions, and we are enormously in their debt for their
efforts.
OMISSIONS
One of the stocks-in-trade of book reviewers is to say that it is
not their job to criticize one author for writing the book the re
viewer wished the author had written, and then to make such criti-
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cisms anyway. I will not bother to deny that I am about to engage
in such a paralepsis.
Miller, having drawn our attention to what he rightly notes is a
neglected episode in American history and having thereby illumi
nated the use of a nearly invisible constitutional institution, tells us
far too little about the institution of the petition itself. He wants to
tell a story about heroic opposition to slavery, and the gag-rule is
his vehicle. While he thereby materially enriches public under
standing of the right to petition as well as of antislavery, Miller
would have profited by a richer historical explanation of the peti
tioning the Quakers and other abolitionists undertook. The gag
rule is not just an episode in antislavery, of course, but is also an
episode in the history of petitioning.
I have already suggested that this inattention renders Adams's
opposition to the gag-rule a historical curiosity. If Miller had better
explained the institution itself, he would have situated Adams as
simply the last of a school who regarded petition as the core form of
political communication with governmental institutions and person
nel.60 The advent of sophisticated communication and transporta
tion systems, the vehicles of centralized political parties, the
explosion of printed media, and, above all, the growth of the
franchise itself, had rendered petitions and petitioning less impor
tant. 61 Adams was thus not quixotic, but old-fashioned.
Similarly, the petitioning by women and others was not really
unprecedented, as Miller seems to suggest, in the nineteenth cen
tury62 or even earlier.63 The scale of their participation, however,
was. Moreover, at least some of the women tapped into a long tra
dition of participation by petition and were far from shy about their
political sentiments in conducting the petition campaign. As Lydia
Maria Child noted, for example, "[t]he fact is, you cannot raise a
solid anti-slavery structure upon an aristocratic ground-work.
There is no moral cement by which the two things can be held to
gether. "64 Such women were not, as Miller puts it, "a powerless
and marginal handful of practitioners of a new sort of reform" (p.
65). Marginal they were, but powerless, no. The indication of the
60. See Mark, supra note 5, at 2223, 2225.
61. See id. at 2226-2228, 2230.
62. See Loru D. GINZBURG, WOMEN AND TIIB WoRIC OF BENEVOLENCE: MoRALITY,
PoLmcs, AND CLAss IN TIIB NINETEENTII CENruRY UNITED STATES (1990).
63. See Mark, supra note 5, at 2182-85.
64. Lydia Maria Child to Ellis Gray Loring, August 16, 1838, Ellis Gray Loring papers,
1828-1919, Box 2, folder 122, Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe College, Harvard University. See
also, e.g., Angelina E. Grimke, Appeal to Christian Women ofthe South, Vol. 1, § 2 (Septem
ber 1836), THE ANTI-SLAVERY EXAMINER, 25 reprinted (Westport, Ct.: Negro Universities
Press) ("Let them embody themselves in societies, and send petitions up to their different
legislatures, entreating their husbands, fathers, brothers and sons, to abolish the institution of
slavery.").
-
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threat they posed was the venom with which they were attacked.
Moreover, as moral and political agents, they acted with the consti
tutional tool available to them, a tool of significant historical power.
Miller's story would thus have been materially and subtly en
riched if he had described petition as a constitutional vehicle in
eclipse. The petitioners would have been paid more attention in a
different political culture. The petition campaign itself, the peti
tions circulated, and the understanding of the political obligations
of the House would all have been different in a different era. Such
an era was within living memory, indeed was within the memory of
John Quincy Adams. Failure to provide the details of petition's
constitutional role weakens Miller's story. It does not detract from
the heroism of Adams and Miller's other champions, but their stat
ure, and that of the petitioners themselves, especially the women,
would have been different had Miller incorporated a richer under
standing of the institution they put in service of their beliefs, both
antislavery and pro-petition.
Similarly, for all its breadth and profound revisionism, Rabban's
story would have been richer had he been able to focus more of his
attention on the debate about free speech within the executive
branch and Congress, and among the cultural dissidents themselves.
In places we are given such context, as in discussions within Con
gress and the executive about the wisdom, constitutional and other
wise, in adopting and using the Espionage Act (pp. 248-55).
Elsewhere such discussions are curiously absent. All the more curi
ous, since what emerges with crystalline clarity from Rabban's work
is the judicial hostility to novel claims for free speech. The dissi
dents to whom he refers, and certainly their lawyers, knew of the
hostility. Where, then, did their claims come from? Some cultural
tradition, some institutional embodiment of their claims - claims
which were made after all, as if they were not novel - had to have
informed such beliefs. Belief in personal autonomy is one thing.
Belief that such autonomy is embodied in the Free Speech Clause,
quite another. My complaint is, however, probably premature.
Rabban promises to push his revisionism back further (p. 20), and I
eagerly await that work.
I freely admit that these criticisms are minor ones. These are
important books, especially when read together. However difficult
constitutional lawyers and some historians find assimilating these
works, all will benefit from the ways in which they expand our legal
and historical imaginations. They suggest, at a minimum, that we
should not, either as lawyers or historians, think that only courts
and grand thinkers add to our understanding of constitutional
meaning. They suggest that we should revisit the clauses of the
Constitution which today are dormant, not simply to uncover their
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history and to give a richer picture of the constitutional whole, but
to suggest ways in which, in an altered political culture and an alto
gether different physical and social context, these dormant clauses
may embody values we have engrafted onto other clauses today.
Finally, of course, they counsel caution in accepting received wis
dom wholesale. Constitutional meaning is, after all, a cultural prod
uct, the contextual production of which merits our close attention.

